An alliance is a relationship among people, groups, or states that have joined together for mutual benefit or to achieve some common purpose, whether or not an explicit agreement has been worked out among them.[1] Members of an alliance are called allies. Alliances form in many settings, including political alliances, military alliances, and business alliances. When the term is used in the context of war or armed struggle, such associations may also be called allied powers, especially when discussing World War I or World War II.
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A formal military alliance is not required for being perceived as an ally—co-belligerence, fighting alongside someone, is enough. According to this usage, allies become so not when concluding an alliance treaty but when struck by war.
After the end of World War II and during the Cold War, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was formed as a political and military alliance that promotes anti-communist values.[3]
Scholars are divided as to the impact of alliances. Several studies find that defensive alliances deter conflict.[4][5][6][7] One study questions these findings, showing that alliance commitments deterred conflict in the prenuclear era but has no statistically meaningful impact on war in the postnuclear era.[8][9] Another study finds that while alliance commitments deter conflict between sides with a recent history of conflict, alliances tend to provoke conflicts between states without such a history.[10]
A 2000 study in the Journal of Conflict Resolution found that allies fulfill their alliance commitments approximately 75% of the time.[11] Most research suggests that democracies are more reliable allies than non-democracies.[12][13][14] A 2004 study did however question whether alliance commitments by democracies are more durable.[15] A 2018 study updated and extended the data from the 2000 Journal of Conflict Resolution study and found that allies only fulfill their commitments about 50% of the time from 1816 to 2003.[16] According to the study, "States honored their alliance commitments 66% of the time prior to 1945 but the compliance rate drops to 22% from 1945 to 2003. Moreover, the rates of fulfillment for defense pacts (41%) and nonaggression pacts (37%) are dramatically lower than offensive alliances (74%) and neutrality agreements (78%)."[16]
One of the most profound effects of alliances can be seen in technological innovation, due to conduits of knowledge flows that are open between allies but closed between rivals.[17]
International opinion
According to a 2017 poll by WIN/GIA, the United States was the most preferred ally internationally. Russia and China, who preferred one another, both trailed America globally. Four countries, Bulgaria, Greece, Slovenia and Turkey, preferred Russia, despite being members of NATO.[18]
In Pakistan, 72% of respondents preferred ties to China, the largest margin of any country surveyed, while 46% of Bangladesh preferred India. A total of 22 countries indicated a preference for the United Kingdom at a rate of 10% or more, but the United States was the only country to prefer Britain over any other, at a rate of 43%. Five countries preferred France at a rate of 10% or more, led by Belgium at a rate of 25%. A single country, Iraq, expressed no preference, while three other countries, Lebanon, Palestine, and Slovenia, expressed no preference at a rate of 11% or more, although at a smaller rate than their preference for Russia on the part of Lebanon and Slovenia, and China on the part of Palestine. Kosovo reported the most unified opinion, preferring the United States at a rate of 92%, while Russia's most unified supporters were Mongolia (71%), Armenia (67%) and Serbia (56%). In total, 21 countries expressed a preference for America at a rate of 50% or more.[18]
More information Country polled, Russia ...
Results of 2017 poll by WIN/GIA. Most preferred ally in case of military threat[18][19] figures of United States lower than 30%, Russia (<14%), of United Kingdom (<10%), France (<6%), none (<12%) and China (<10%) may be hidden
Larsen, Stanley; Collins, James (1975). Allied Participation in Vietnam. Vietnam Studies. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army. OCLC1119579. Archived from the original on January 27, 2013. Retrieved January 15, 2013.
Leeds, Brett Ashley (2003-07-01). "Do Alliances Deter Aggression? The Influence of Military Alliances on the Initiation of Militarized Interstate Disputes". American Journal of Political Science. 47 (3): 427–439. doi:10.1111/1540-5907.00031. ISSN1540-5907.
Kenwick, Michael R.; Vasquez, John A.; Powers, Matthew A. (2015-10-01). "Do Alliances Really Deter?". The Journal of Politics. 77 (4): 943–954. doi:10.1086/681958. ISSN0022-3816. S2CID9921552.
Kenwick, Michael R.; Vasquez, John A. (2016-11-10). "Defense Pacts and Deterrence: Caveat Emptor". The Journal of Politics. 79: 329–334. doi:10.1086/686700. ISSN0022-3816. S2CID157263860.
Morrow, James D. (2016-11-10). "When Do Defensive Alliances Provoke Rather than Deter?". The Journal of Politics. 79: 341–345. doi:10.1086/686973. ISSN0022-3816. S2CID157788422.
Leeds, Brett Ashley (2003-01-01). "Alliance Reliability in Times of War: Explaining State Decisions to Violate Treaties". International Organization. 57 (4): 801–827. doi:10.1017/s0020818303574057. JSTOR3594847. S2CID154260997.
Leeds, Brett Ashley; Mattes, Michaela; Vogel, Jeremy S. (2009-04-01). "Interests, Institutions, and the Reliability of International Commitments". American Journal of Political Science. 53 (2): 461–476. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00381.x. ISSN1540-5907.
Gartzke, Erik; Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede (2004-10-01). "Why Democracies May Actually Be Less Reliable Allies". American Journal of Political Science. 48 (4): 775–795. doi:10.1111/j.0092-5853.2004.00101.x. ISSN1540-5907.
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